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Abstract 
    Trust transitivity, as trust itself, is a human mental 
phenomenon, so there is no such thing as objective 
transitivity, and trust transitivity therefore lends itself 
to different interpretations. Trust transitivity and trust 
fusion both are important elements in computational 
trust. This paper analyses the parameter dependence 
problem in trust transitivity and proposes some 
definitions considering the effects of base rate. In 
addition, it also proposes belief functions based on 
subjective logic to analyse trust transitivity of three 
specified cases with sensitive and insensitive based 
rate. Then it presents a quantitative analysis of the 
issue of exaggerated beliefs in Mass Hysteria based on 
subjective logic. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
    Trust transitivity is the most explicit form of 
computational trust, meaning for example that if Alice 
trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Claire, then by transitivity, it 
can be computed that Alice will also trust Claire [3]. 
This assumes that Bob recommends Claire to Alice. 
This simple principle, which is essential for human 
interaction in business and everyday life, manifest it in 
many different forms. This paper investigates the 
parameter dependence problem in trust transitivity and 
proposes possible formal computational models that 
can be implemented using belief reasoning based on 
subjective logic. With adequate computational trust 
models, the principles of trust propagation can be 
ported to online communities of people, organizations 
and software agents, with the purpose of enhancing the 
quality of those communities. 
    In uncertain probability theory [14], the metric which 
express belief is called opinion. Under a defined scope, 
trust relationships can support transitivity [18,20]. The 
use of trust in transitive chains requires the existence of 
a common purpose which needs somehow to be derived 
from or given by a specific transitive chain [17,21]. 
Subjective logic takes both the uncertainty and 
individuality of beliefs into account while still being 
compatible with standard logic and probability 
calculus. The migration from the assumed towards the 
perceived world is achieved by adding an uncertainty 
dimension to the single valued probability measure, and 
by taking the individuality of beliefs into account. Trust 
can be interpreted as a belief about the reliability of an 
object, and as a decision to depend on an object [10]. In 
this paper, trust is interpreted as a belief about 
reliability. As a calculus of beliefs, subjective logic can 
therefore be used for trust reasoning. Although this 
model can never be perfect, and able to reflect all the 
nuances of trust, it can be shown to respect the main 
intuitive properties of trust and trust propagation. 
    As soon as one attempts to perform computations 
with input parameters in the form of subjective trust 
measures, parameter dependence becomes a major 
issue. If Alice for example wants to know whether 
tomorrow will be sunny, she can ask her friends, and if 
they all say it will be sunny she will start believing the 
same. However, her friends might all have based their 
opinions on the same weather-forecast, so their 
opinions are dependent, and in that case, asking only 
one of them would be sufficient. It would in fact be 
wrong of Alice to take all her friends’ opinions into 
account as being independent, because it would 
strengthen her opinion without any good reason. Being 
able to identify cases of dependent opinions is therefore 
important, though it is difficult. 
    In section 2, we have introduced the trust 
computational model with subjective logic. We have 
identified two problems of trust transitivity in section 3. 
In section 4, we have shown the effect of not being 
aware of dependence between opinions. By giving an 
appropriate example, we have shown that it is possible 
for recommended opinions to return to their originator 
through feedback loops, resulting in even more 
exaggerated beliefs and with repeated loops, it may 
create a mass hysteria. In section 5, we have concluded 
the outcome of this research. 
 
 
2. Computing Trust 
 
    Trust has become important topic of research in 
many fields including sociology, psychology, 
philosophy, economics, business, law and IT. It is not a 
new topic to discuss. In fact, it has been the topic of 
hundreds books and scholarly articles over a long 
period of time. Trust is a complex word with multiple 
dimensions. A vast literature on trust has grown in 
several area of research but it is relatively confusing 
and sometimes contradictory, because the term is being 
used with a variety of meaning [19]. The most cited 
definition of trust is given by Dasgupta where he 
defines trust as “the expectation of one person about 
the actions of others that affects the first person’s 
choice, when an action must be taken before the actions 
of others are known” [11]. This definition captures both 
the purpose of trust and its nature in a form that can be 
reasoned about.  
    Deutsch [12] states that “trusting behaviour occurs 
when a person encounters a situation where she 
perceives an ambiguous path. The result of following 
the path can be good or bad and the occurrence of the 
good or bad result is contingent on the action of another 
person” [16]. Another definition for trust by Gambetta 
is also often quoted in the literature: “trust (or, 
symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the 
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action, both before he can monitor such 
action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able 
to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his 
own action” [14]. But trust can be more complex than 
these definitions. Golbeck et al [15] has proposed a 
definition of trust suitable for use in web-based social 
networks with a discussion of the properties that 
influenced its use in computation. They have also 
presented two algorithms for inferring trust 
relationships between individuals that are not directly 
connected in the network. 
 
    Subjective logic is a belief calculus specifically 
developed for modeling trust relationships [3,9]. In 
subjective logic, beliefs are represented on binary state 
spaces, where each of the two possible states can 
consist of sub-states. Belief functions on binary state 
spaces are called subjective opinions and are formally 
expressed in the form of an ordered tuple Axω  = (b, d, 
u, a), where b, d, and u represent belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty respectively where b, d, u ∈  [0, 1] and 
b+d+u = 1. The base rate parameter a ∈  [0, 1] 
represents the base rate probability in the absence of 
evidence, and is used for computing an opinion’s 
probability expectation value E( Axω ) = b + au, 
meaning that a determines how uncertainty shall 
contribute to E( Axω ). A subjective opinion is 
interpreted as an agent A’s belief in the truth of 
statement x. Ownership of an opinion is represented as 
a superscript so that for example A’s opinion about x is 
denoted as Axω . 
    The fact that subjective logic is compatible with 
binary logic and probability calculus means that 
whenever corresponding operators exist in probability 
calculus, the probability expectation value E(ω) of an 
opinion ω that has been derived with subjective logic, 
is always equal to the probability value that would have 
been derived had simple probability calculus been 
applied. Similarly, whenever corresponding binary 
logic operators exist, an absolute opinion (i.e. 
equivalent to binary logic TRUE or FALSE) derived 
with subjective logic, is always equal to the truth value 
that can be derived with binary logic. 
    Subjective logic has a sound mathematical basis and 
is compatible with binary logic and traditional 
Bayesian analysis. Subjective logic defines a rich set of 
operators for combining subjective opinions in various 
ways [1–9]. Some operators represent generalizations 
of binary logic and probability calculus, whereas others 
are unique to belief calculus because they depend on 
belief ownership. With belief ownership it is possible 
to explicitly express that different agents have different 
opinions about the same issue. The advantage of 
subjective logic over probability calculus and binary 
logic is its ability to explicitly express and take 
advantage of ignorance and belief ownership [3]. 
Subjective logic can be applied to all situations where 
probability calculus can be applied, and to many 
situations where probability calculus fails precisely 
because it can not capture degrees of ignorance. 
Subjective opinions can be interpreted as probability 
density functions, making subjective logic a simple and 
efficient calculus for probability density functions. 
 
3. Analyzing Trust Transitivity 
 
    Assume two agents A and B where A trusts B, and B 
believes that proposition x is true. Then by transitivity, 
agent A will also believe that proposition x is true. This 
assumes that B recommends x to A. In our approach, 
trust and belief are formally expressed as opinions. The 
transitive linking of these two opinions consists of 
discounting B’s opinion about x by A’s opinion about 
B, in order to derive A’s opinion about x. This principle 
is illustrated in Fig.1 below. The solid arrows represent 
initial direct trust, and the dotted arrow represents 
derived indirect trust. 
 
Fig. 1. Principle of Trust Transitivity 
    Trust transitivity, as trust itself, is a human mental 
phenomenon, so there is no such thing as objective 
transitivity, and trust transitivity therefore lends itself to 
different interpretations. We have identified two main 
difficulties. The first is related to the effect of A 
disbelieving that B will give a good advice. What does 
this exactly mean? We will give two different 
interpretations and definitions. The second difficulty 
relates to the effect of base rate trust in a transitive 
path. We will briefly examine this, and provide the 
definition of a base rate sensitive discounting operator 
as an alternative to the two previous which are base rate 
insensitive. 
3.1 Uncertainty Favoring Trust Transitivity 
A’s disbelief in the recommending agent B means that 
A thinks that B ignores the truth value of x. As a result 
A also ignores the truth value of x. 
Definition 1 (Uncertainty Favoring Discounting).  
Let A, B and be two agents where A’s opinion about 
B’s recommendations is expressed as 
A
Bω ={ ABb , ABd , ABu , ABa },  and let x be a proposition 
where B’s opinion about x is recommended to A with 
the opinion Bxω ={ Bxb , Bxd , Bxu , Bxa } Let 
BA
x
:ω ={ BAxb : , BAxd : , BAxu : , BAxa : } be the opinion such 
that:  
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then BAx
:ω is called the uncertainty favoring discounted 
opinion of A. By using the symbol ⊗ to designate this 
operation, we get BAx
:ω = ABω ⊗
B
xω . 
    It is easy to prove that this operator is associative but 
not commutative. This means that the combination of 
opinions can start in either end of the path, and that the 
order in which opinions are combined is significant. In 
a path with more than one recommending entity, 
opinion independence must be assumed, which for 
example translates into not allowing the same entity to 
appear more than once in a transitive path. Fig.2 
illustrates an example of applying the discounting 
operator for independent opinions, where ABω  = {0.1, 
0.8, 0.1} discounts Bxω  = {0.8, 0.1, 0.1} to produce 
BA
x
:ω = {0.08, 0.01, 0.91}. 
  
Fig. 2. Example of applying the discounting operator for 
independent opinions 
3.2 Opposite Belief Favoring 
A’s disbelief in the recommending agent B means that 
A thinks that B consistently recommends the opposite 
of his real opinion about the truth value of x. As a 
result, A not only disbelieves in x to the degree that B 
recommends belief, but she also believes in x to the 
degree that B recommends disbelief in x, because the 
combination of two disbeliefs results in belief in this 
case. 
Definition 2 (Opposite Belief Favoring Discounting).  
Let A, B and be two agents where A’s opinion about 
B’s recommendations is expressed as 
A
Bω ={ ABb , ABd , ABu , ABa }, and let x be a proposition 
where B’s opinion about x is recommended to A as the 
opinion Bxω  = { Bxb , Bxd , Bxu , Bxa }. Let 
BA
x
:ω ={ BAxb : , BAxd : , BAxu : , BAxa : } be the opinion such 
that:  







=
++=
+=
+=
B
x
BA
x
B
x
A
B
A
B
A
B
BA
x
B
x
A
B
B
x
A
B
BA
x
B
x
A
B
B
x
A
B
BA
x
aa
udbuu
dbdbd
ddbbb
:
:
:
:
)(
 
then BAx
:ω is called the opposite belief favoring 
discounted recommendation from B to A. By using the 
symbol ⊗ to designate this operation, we get 
BA
x
:ω = ABω ⊗
B
xω . 
    This operator models the principle that “your 
enemy’s enemy is your friend”. That might be the case 
in some situations, and the operator should only be 
applied when the situation makes it plausible. It is 
doubtful whether it is meaningful to model more than 
two arcs in a transitive path with this principle. In other 
words, it is doubtful whether the enemy of your 
enemy’s enemy necessarily is your enemy too. 
3.3 Base Rate Sensitive Transitivity 
In the transitivity operators defined in Sec.4.1 and 
Sec.4.2 above, ABa  had no influence on the discounting 
of the recommended ),,( BxBxBx udb  parameters. This 
can seem counterintuitive in many cases such as in the 
example described next. 
    Imagine a stranger coming to a town which is know 
for its citizens being honest. The stranger is looking for 
a car mechanic, and asks the first person he meets to 
direct him to a good car mechanic. The stranger 
receives the reply that there are two car mechanics in 
town, David and Eric, where David is cheap but does 
not always do quality work, and Eric might be a bit 
more expensive, but he always does a perfect job. 
Translated into the formalism of subjective logic, the 
stranger has no other info about the person he asks than 
the base rate that the citizens in the town are honest. 
The stranger is thus ignorant, but the expectation value 
of a good advice is still very high. Without taking ABa  
into account, the result of the definitions above would 
be that the stranger is completely ignorant about which 
if the mechanics is the best. 
    An intuitive approach would then be to let the 
expectation value of the stranger’s trust in the 
recommender be the discounting factor for the 
recommended ),( BxBx db parameters. 
Definition 3 (Base Rate Sensitive Discounting).  
The base rate sensitive discounting of a belief Bxω  = 
{ Bxb , Bxd , Bxu , Bxa } by a belief 
A
Bω ={ ABb , ABd , ABu , ABa } produces the transitive belief 
BA
x
:ω ={ BAxb : , BAxd : , BAxu : , BAxa : } where 
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    However this operator must be applied with care. 
Assume again the town of honest citizens, and let the 
stranger A have the opinion ABω  = (0, 0, 1, 0.99) about 
the first person B she meets, i.e. the opinion has no 
basis in evidence other than a very high base rate 
defined by ABa  = 0.99. If the person B now 
recommends to A the opinion Bxω  = (1, 0, 0, a), then, 
according to the base rate sensitive discounting 
operator of Def.4, A will have the belief BAx
:ω  = (0.99, 
0, 0.01, a) in x. In other words, the highly certain belief 
BA
x
:ω  is derived on the basis of the highly uncertain 
belief ABω , which can seem counterintuitive. This 
potential problem could be amplified as the trust path 
gets longer. A safety principle could therefore be to 
only apply the base rate sensitive discounting to the last 
transitive link. 
    There might be other principles that better reflect 
human intuition for trust transitivity, but we will leave 
this question to future research. It would be fair to say 
that the base rate insensitive discounting operator of 
Def.2 is safe and conservative, and that the base rate 
sensitive discounting operator of Def.4 can be more 
intuitive in some situations, but must be applied with 
care. 
     
4. The Effects of Unknown Dependence 
 
    One of the strengths of this work is in its analytical 
capabilities. As an example, consider how mass 
hysteria can be caused by people not being aware of 
dependence between opinions. Let’s take for example; 
person A recommend an opinion about a particular 
statement x to a group of other persons. Without being 
aware of the fact that the opinion came from the same 
origin, these persons can recommend their opinions to 
each other as illustrated in Fig.3. 
        
Fig. 3. The effects of unknown dependence 
    The arrows represent trust so that for example B → A 
can be interpreted as saying that B trusts A to 
recommend an opinion about statement x. The actual 
recommendation goes, of course, in the opposite 
direction to the arrows in Fig.3. It can be seen that A 
recommends an opinion about x to 6 other agents, and 
that G receives 6 recommendations in all. If G assumes 
the recommended opinions to be independent and takes 
the consensus between them, his opinion can become 
abnormally strong and in fact even stronger than A’s 
opinion.  
    As a numerical example, let A’s opinion Axω  about x 
as well as the agents’ opinions about each other 
( BAω , CAω , CBω , DAω , DBω , DCω , EAω , EBω , ECω , EDω ,
F
Aω ,
F
Bω ,
F
Cω ,
F
Dω ,
F
Eω ,
G
Aω ,
G
Bω ,
G
Cω ,
G
Dω ,
G
Eω ,
G
Fω
) all have the same value given by (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, a). 
    In this example, we will apply the consensus 
operator for independent beliefs to illustrate the effect 
of unknown dependence. We also apply the uncertainty 
favoring discounting operator which does not take base 
rates into account. Taking all the possible 
recommendations of Fig.6 into account creates a 
relatively complex trust graph, and a rather long 
notation. In order to reduce the size of the notation, the 
transitivity symbol “:” will simply be omitted, and the 
cumulative fusion symbol _ will simply be written as 
“,”. Analyzing the whole graph of dependent paths, as 
if they were independent, will then produce: 










GFEDCBA GFEDCA, GFEDBA, GFEDA,
GFECBA, GFECA, GFEBA, GFEA, GFDCBA, GFDCA, GFDBA, GFDA,
GFCBA, GFCA, GFBA, GFA, GEDCBA, GEDCA, GEDBA,GEDA, GECBA,
GECA,GEBA,GEA, GDCBA, GDCA, GDBA, GDA, GCBA, GCA, GBA, GA,
xω
= (0.76, 0.11, 0.13, a) 
    For comparison, if G only took the recommendation 
from A into account (as he should), his derived opinion 
would be AGx
:ω  = {0.49, 0.07, 0.44, a}. 
    In real situations it is possible for recommended 
opinions to return to their originator through feedback 
loops, resulting in even more exaggerated beliefs. 
When this process continues, an environment of self 
amplifying opinions, and thereby hysteria, is created. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
    Trust propagation does not manifest itself as a 
physical phenomenon in nature, but only exists on the 
mental and cognitive level. It is therefore difficult to 
assess whether computational models for trust 
propagation are adequate and reflect the way people 
reason about trust. A number of principles have been 
described to model the propagation of trust. We have 
discussed the shortcomings of computational trust 
based on subjective logic by the risk of over counting 
of trust evidence when opinions are not independent 
and have described a set of computational trust 
principles that reflect intuitive trust propagation 
constructs. Different situations require different trust 
models. With appropriate computational trust models, 
the principles of trust propagation can be ported to 
online communities of people, organizations and 
software agents, with the purpose of enhancing the 
quality of those communities. The specific 
computational trust operators must therefore be 
selected as a function of the situation to be modelled. 
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